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Abstract: Super PACs, 501(c)4  social welfare organizations, and 501(c)6 
 professional associations are now major spenders in House elections. What 
remains unclear is how the strategic expenditure choices of these respective 
outside interest groups impact the competitive position of non-incumbent can-
didates running for the House – specifically do their advertising expenditures 
undermine or augment the expenditures made by the campaign. Using the Wes-
leyan Media Project datasets of 2012 and 2014 in combination with campaign 
finance data in a series of models, I find early television advertising expendi-
tures by the aforementioned 501(c) dark money organizations diminish the 
effectiveness of non-incumbents’ campaign expenditures – both on television 
advertising and in general – whereas super PACs’ early television advertising 
expenditures have no significant impact on campaign spending. A compari-
son of 501(c) dark money organizations’ and super PACs’ advertising choices in 
2012 and 2014 reveals these differential effects likely relate to legal constraints 
leading 501(c)s, and not super PACs, to devote more resources toward policy 
advertisements early in the general election cycle. I argue this choice by 501(c) s 
makes it difficult for non-incumbents’ campaigns to shape the policy agenda 
early in the race leading the campaign’s expenditures on television advertising 
and the campaign’s total disbursements to be less effective in terms of improving 
the candidate’s competitiveness.
Introduction
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizen United (558 U.S. 310, 2010) in favor of inde-
pendent expenditure-only groups fundamentally altered the financial power 
dynamics of federal elections. Super PACs, 501(c)4 social welfare organizations, 
and 501(c)6 professional associations have become the dominant spenders in con-
gressional contests thanks to their ability to raise and spend unlimited amounts 
of money as long as they keep their operations independent from federal cam-
paigns and political parties (Smith and Powell 2013; La Raja 2014; 558 U.S. 310, 
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2010). Candidate campaigns cannot hope to attain similar spending power as a 
consequence of the restrictions on the amounts of money they are permitted to 
raise under the remaining components of campaign finance law (La Raja 2014). 
As a consequence, it is clear that the financial challenges confronting non-incum-
bent House campaigns in particular have never been greater.
What remains more uncertain is whether outside groups’ expenditures are 
helpful to non-incumbents’ House campaigns or if they create new challenges 
for them. Further complicating matters is the fact that all outside groups are not 
functionally the same. Independent spending by PACs and super PACs and inde-
pendent spending by 501(c)4 social welfare and 501(c)6 professional associations, 
which have been labeled “dark money” organization by the media and watchdog 
groups, may have distinct impacts on the effectiveness of each dollar the cam-
paign spends. PACs and super PACs have been theorized to serve as allies to cam-
paigns (Farrar-Myers and Skinner 2012; Herrnson 2012; Baker 2014; Christenson 
and Smidt 2014; La Raja 2014) by providing “functionally co ordinated” support 
(Farrar-Myers and Skinner 2012), such as supplementing targeted expenditures 
made by the campaign thereby amplifying the effect of each dollar spent by the 
campaign (Christenson and Smidt 2014), and by mirroring candidate support 
provided by the party organizations (Dwyre and Braz 2015). Dark money organi-
zations’ goals and activities remain more shrouded but there are good reasons 
to suspect that their independent spending, unlike spending by super PACs and 
PACs, has a greater likelihood of diminishing the effectiveness of each dollar the 
campaign spends rather than amplifying the effect of each dollar spent.
Why might this be so? By employing data from the Wesleyan Media Project 
for the congressional elections of 2012 and 2014 (Fowler, Franz and Ridout 
2015, 2017), I demonstrate 501(c) dark money organizations advertise early in 
the general election cycle and focus on policy promotion more frequently than 
super PACs. In a series of models, I test the impact of these independent spend-
ing choices on the effectiveness of the expenditures made by non-incumbent 
House campaigns. I find expenditures on early television advertising by 501(c) 
dark money organizations diminish the value of each dollar the campaign spends 
to increase its chances of winning the race. I argue early independent spending 
by 501(c) dark money organizations makes it more difficult for non-incumbent 
House campaigns to set the policy agenda initially in the race and to build name 
recognition and credibility even as the campaign spends more money to accom-
plish these goals. Thus, the results suggest 501(c) dark money organizations are 
not “functionally coordinating” their television advertising expenditures in ways 
that support the campaigns of non-incumbent House candidates. In fact, 501(c) 
dark money organizations, unlike PACs and Super PACs, are not serving as true 
campaign allies because – whether intended or not – their independent  spending 
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choices actually make it more difficult for non-incumbent House candidates to 
spend money effectively over the course of the entire general election cycle.
Are Outside Spending Groups Campaign Allies?
Previous studies suggest super PACs often play the role of campaign allies 
by implementing parallel campaigns in support of particular candidates 
( Farrar-Myers and Skinner 2012; Herrnson 2012; Christenson and Smidt 2014; 
Dwyre and Kolodny 2014; La Raja 2014). Dwyre and Braz (2015) theorize super 
PACs “allocate their independent expenditures according to an electoral strat-
egy to impact the partisan composition of government” thereby mirroring the 
roles played by party organizations (251). Building upon Magleby’s (2014) typol-
ogy of super PACs, Dwyre and Braz (2015) argue there are four distinct types of 
super PACs with different electoral goals: “candidate-specific super PACs, parti-
san super PACs, ideological super PACs, and access-oriented super PACs” (254). 
They present evidence showing most of the super PACs that were active in the 
2012 election were candidate-specific super PACs and most of the other super PAC 
spending was done by “party congruent” super PACs, which mirrored the party 
committees’ involvement in particular House and Senate races. Farrar-Myers and 
Skinner (2012) observe similar patterns and take it a step further arguing that 
many expenditures by super PACs are “functionally coordinated with candidates’ 
campaign expenditures” (112). In sum, these studies suggest most PACs and super 
PACs are likely to be part of the extended party network operating in ways that 
benefit candidate campaigns (Koger, Masket and Noel 2009). It is possible to 
gather evidence in support of this contention because PACs and super PACs must 
report their spending and fundraising to the U.S. Federal Election Commission.
The relationships of 501(c)4 and 501(c)6 dark money organizations to party 
networks and candidate campaigns are less easily understood because their 
spending is not reported on a per candidate or per race basis, and, indeed, the 
bulk of their fundraising and spending is not reported in detail at all even to the 
US Internal Revenue Service. Nonetheless, it is possible to surmise that the inde-
pendent expenditures of these organizations might be inherently less helpful to 
non-incumbents’ House campaigns in particular because of legal constraints that 
influence when and how 501(c) dark money organizations independently spend 
their money. Although, like super PACs, 501(c)4 and 501(c)6 organizations may 
spend unlimited amounts of money independently on express advocacy, unlike 
super PACs, electioneering efforts cannot be their primary purpose as organi-
zations (Dwyre and Braz 2015). The IRS has not provided a clear standard for 
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determining when an organization’s electoral/political activities constitute their 
primary purpose; however, in effect, this requirement has been interpreted to 
mean that at least 50% percent of the organization’s budget must be spent on 
activities that are not candidate or party focused (Dougherty 2013).
This constraint incentivizes 501(c)4 and 501(c)6 organizations (hereafter 
501(c) organizations) to spend independently to produce issue advertisements 
that mention candidates but do not expressly advocate for their election (Maguire 
2014a,b; Balcerzack 2016; WPR/CRP Special Report 2016). Still, issue or policy 
advertisements are considered electioneering communications under the Bipar-
tisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 when they fall within 30 days of a 
primary election or 60 days of a general election (U.S. Federal Election Commis-
sion). Contributions towards ads that are aired within the windows close to each 
election must be reported to the FEC by all groups, including 501(c) organizations. 
As many dark money organizations, particularly 501(c)4 social welfare groups, 
exist primarily to shield the identity of their donors, this provision in the law 
incentivizes these organizations to make independent expenditures on advertise-
ments before the 30-day and 60-day windows of time that fall before the primary 
and general elections, respectively. Reports by both the Center for Responsive 
Politics and the Wesleyan Media Project demonstrate that dark money organiza-
tions have a higher tendency to produce policy advertising prior to the reporting 
windows; the number of ads by organizations that do not disclose or partially 
disclose their donors drops precipitously after the reporting window begins; and 
only a few organizations that otherwise do not disclose their donors continue 
to air ads after the reporting window opens (Maguire 2014a,b; Balcerzack 2016; 
WPR/CRP Special Report 2016). In sum, 501(c) dark money organizations use 
their independent expenditures to air ads early before each election in the cycle 
and are likely to be more policy-focused in their advertisements.
Outside Groups’ Advertising Expenditure Choices
To gain a better sense of how 501(c) dark money organizations’ advertising 
choices in 2012 and 2014 might impact the effectiveness of non-incumbent candi-
dates’ campaign expenditures, I utilize advertising data from the Wesleyan Media 
Project (WMP) covering those congressional elections (Fowler, Franz, and Ridout 
2015, 2017). I coded the interest group sponsors of the ads using their names to 
identify their tax status as 501(c) organizations or as super PACs. Non-connected 
PACs making unlimited independent expenditures are treated and coded as super 
PACs. I do not include 527s in the analysis. The results are presented in Table 1. 
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Prior to the 60-day window before the general election in 2012, 501(c) organiza-
tions aired 37% of their television advertisements (see first row in Table 1). While 
more of their advertising occurred after the window opened, they still chose to air 
a higher percentage of ads earlier than super PACs, which aired only 23% of their 
ads before the 60-day window (see Table 1). In 2014, the bulk of 501(c) organiza-
tions’ advertising occurred prior to the 60-day window, with 60% of the 501(c) 
organizations’ ads airing before it opened and 41% of super PACs airing ads prior 
to its opening.
In addition to the timing of advertisements, I compared the content of the 
advertisements using a question from the WMP asking coders to judge whether 
the primary focus of the advertisement was the personal characteristics of the 
candidate or policy matters. The results of this classification appear in Table 1 
and must be interpreted with some caution as the inter-coder reliability percent-
age was lower for this WMP question. Still, this variable can provide a sense of 
general differences in the content of ads. Some ads perform multiple functions, 
such as promoting a policy while attacking a candidate, so the percentages for 
each category in Table 1 do not add up to 100 percent due to double counting. 
What this classification reveals is that 501(c) organizations do engage in more 
policy promotion than super PACs. A total of 29% percent of the ads aired by 
501(c) organizations in 2012 and a total of 42% percent of the ads in 2014 promoted 
a policy whereas, respectively, 13% and 26% of super PAC ads did so in those 
election years. Additionally, 501(c) organizations tend to air policy ads before the 
Table 1: Outside Group Television Advertising in All House Races.
Type/Timing of Ads 2012 2014
Super PACs 501(c)s Super PACs 501(c)s
Ads Aired Prior to 60-day Window 23% 37% 41% 60%
Policy Attack 81% 67% 69% 58%
Policy Promote 13% 29% 26% 42%
Candidate Attack 25% 10% 22% 12%
Candidate Promote 5% 4% 7% 7%
Policy Promotional Ads Aired 
Before 60-day Window
15% 69% 37% 56%
Data compiled from Wesleyan Media Project congressional files from 2012 to 2014. Some ads 
are double counted as they address both policies as well as candidates. Therefore, the columns 
do not add up to 100 percent. Cells represent the percentage of ads aired according to the listed 
criteria out of all ads in all House races aired by a specific type of interest group. The 60-day 
window refers to the 60 days prior to the General Election Day. Ads airing in the 60 days prior to 
Election Day must be reported to the Federal Election Commission – before the 60-day window 
opens, the reporting requirements are more flexible (see Discussion).
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60-day window opens. In 2012, 69% of the ads promoting a policy that were aired 
by 501(c) organizations occurred 60 days prior to the general election. Thus, even 
though they only aired 37% of their ads before the 60-day window in 2012, most 
of those ads addressed a policy. In 2014, the percentage of 501(c) organizations’ 
ads promoting a policy prior to the 60-day window was 56% (see Table 1).
The timing and content of interest group advertisements are particularly 
relevant to the spending strategies of non-incumbent campaigns because non-
incumbent candidates’ primary objective is to “shift voters’ focus away from 
incumbency towards alternative criteria” and this often this entails setting the 
issue agenda in the race as early as possible (Abbe et al. 2003; Druckman, Kifer, 
and Parkin 2009, p. 344; Jacobson and Carson 2016). Jacobson and Carson (2016) 
argue “incumbents thrive on campaigns that center on personal performance, 
experience, and services…challengers succeed only when they can frame issues 
in a way that makes these dimensions less relevant and other considerations 
more salient” (127) (see also Groseclose 2001). Although open-seat contests do 
not include an incumbent unless redistricting eliminated an incumbent’s previ-
ous district, arguably setting a positive issue agenda matters more when there 
is no incumbent to attack and when the candidates are less well-known. There 
is some evidence that issue-focused strategies are successful. Herrnson (2000) 
finds that challengers receive 3 percent more votes by running on issues that are 
traditionally associated or owned by their party.
Due to the potential importance of early issue engagement for challengers 
and open seat candidates’ success and the fact that incumbents are less depend-
ent upon issues for their campaign messaging, it is possible that 501(c)4 and 
501(c)6 policy advertisements early in the election cycle might make it more 
difficult for non-incumbent candidates to set the policy agenda of the race and 
control the message being delivered to voters (Devine 2017). In addition to agenda 
setting early in the cycle, non-incumbents are also trying to gain name recog-
nition and introduce themselves as viable options to voters. More advertising 
clutter could prolong the time and increase the costs of achieving these goals. 
Non-incumbent candidates’ control over their messaging is in fact more tenuous 
than it is for incumbents. While super PACs also engage in policy advertising, the 
data in Table 1 shows that they do most of their advertising close to the election 
after the 60-day window has opened and that prior to the 60-day window only 
15% of their ads in 2012 and 37% of their ads in 2014 promoted policies.
As 501(c) organizations are responsible for the bulk of policy advertising 
early in the election cycles of 2012 and 2014, I hypothesize the effectiveness 
of every dollar the campaign spends will be less in districts where 501(c) dark 
money organizations advertise prior to the 60-day window before the general 
election. Due to previous work suggesting super PACs are more likely to parallel 
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the activities of party organizations and are less engaged in early policy advertis-
ing, I hypothesize early independent spending on advertising by these groups 
will not have any impact on the effectiveness of each dollar the campaign spends.
Data and Methods
Two different models test the hypothesis that early television advertising expen-
ditures by 501(c) dark money organizations decrease the effectiveness of the 
expenditures made by the campaign. For the first model, the dependent vari-
able is constructed from the Rothenberg Political Ratings of race competitive-
ness, which classifies House races by increasing competiveness as safe, favored, 
leaning, titling, and toss-up. Following this classification scheme, I compared the 
ratings either at the end of May or June (available reports vary by election year) 
with the rating at the end of October or beginning of November for the election 
cycles of 2012 and 2014. House races in which competition shifted in favor of the 
challenger between these two time-periods are coded 1, 0 otherwise.
As the primary explanatory variables in this model, I employ the estimated 
total cost of television advertisements by 501(c) dark money organizations versus 
super PACs and independent spending PACs at the district level.1 These variables 
were initially collected by Kantar Media/CMAG and provided by the Wesleyan 
Media Project for each ad in the WMP congressional advertisement datasets for 
2012 and 2014 (Fowler, Franz, and Ridout 2015, 2017). After coding the interest 
groups sponsors of the ads by their tax classification and coding advertisements 
by their airing date to determine whether the ad aired prior to the 60-day window 
before the general election or after the window opened, I calculated the total spent 
in thousands of dollars on television advertisements airing prior to the 60-day 
window for each congressional district for each type of interest group. These data 
represent a unique opportunity to examine a portion of 501(c) dark money organ-
izations’ expenditures at the district-level as these expenditures are not reported 
elsewhere. Additionally, I include the total television advertising expenditures 
in thousands of dollars made by the campaign in the race – this variable is also 
calculated by totaling the estimated cost of each ad run by the campaign before 
and after the 60-day window preceding Election Day. These data are also from 
1 Non-connected PACs have the ability to raise and spent unlimited amounts of money if they 
keep those funds in a separate bank account from federally regulated hard money [see Carey v 
FEC; Civ. No. 11-259-RMC (D. D.C. 2011)]. In effect, they are operating as super PACs which is why 
their total spending is combined with super PACs’.
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the Wesleyan Media Projects 2012 and 2014 datasets. Only incumbent-challenger 
races are included in this logistic regression model because a shift in competi-
tion always benefits one non-incumbent or the other in open seat races and I do 
not have a way to determine parsimoniously which candidate might benefit from 
specific television advertising expenditures.2
I interact the campaign’s total television advertising expenditures in thou-
sands of dollars – this represents the total amount spent on television ads after 
the 60-day window opens – separately with each type of interest groups’ expen-
ditures on television advertising before the 60-day window opens. If 501(c) organ-
izations’ early television expenditures undermine the positive and direct effect 
that the campaign’s television advertising expenditures have on improving the 
non-incumbent’s competitiveness, the interaction will be negative. If it is nega-
tive, this is a sign that 501(c) dark money organizations’ early television expendi-
tures diminish the effectiveness of every thousand dollars the campaign spends 
on television advertising during the 60 days leading up to Election Day (i.e. later 
in the cycle). I also control for the campaign’s earlier expenditures on television 
advertising before the 60-day window.
A number of control variables predicting the competitiveness of the race 
are also added to the model. They include whether the candidate has experi-
ence in elected office (Experienced Candidate) or not, and whether the candi-
date is a Republican or not (Republican). The Democratic share of the two-party 
presidential vote is used as a measure of district ideology (Democratic Pres Vote 
Share). The total expenditures of the incumbent candidate in thousands of 
dollars is included because of its likely impact on not only what the challenger 
spends but also because of its influence on the likelihood of electoral success. 
I also use a dummy variable indicating whether the campaign takes place in a 
district with a fragmented media market (Daily Kos 2012). Candidates running 
in these districts are thought to pay more for advertising (Ansolabehere, Behr, 
and Iyengar 1993).
The second model employs a dependent variable consisting of the residuals 
from a simple bi-variate regression of the vote margin the candidate received on 
the campaign’s total disbursements in thousands of dollars. The logic behind this 
2 While some ads in the WMP dataset are labeled as targeting a particular candidate, not all of 
the ads have a label, some ads address more than one candidate, some ads attack one candidate 
and support another, some ads address multiple candidates, and the policy ads – which are of 
particular interest in this study because 501(c) organizations are more likely to run them – do not 
always have a clear target because 501(c) organizations are avoiding anything that would look 
too much like express advocacy. These classification issues create significant hurdles in terms of 
summarizing the amounts directly targeting or supporting one candidate or the other.
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variable is that larger residuals suggest the relationship between the  campaign’s 
expenditures and the candidate’s vote margin is not very strong and, thus, is an 
indication that the candidate’s spending is not doing much to improve the can-
didate’s chances of winning and overall competitive position in the race. Con-
versely, smaller residuals indicate for every thousand dollars the candidate is 
spending, the race is getting closer and thus, the campaign’s expenditures are 
improving the candidate’s competitiveness and chances of success. In sum, this 
dependent variable assesses the tightness of the relationship between what the 
candidate spends and what the candidate gains in terms of his/her margin. The 
2012 and 2014 election cycles are analyzed together in a pooled OLS regression 
model. Several of the same control variables that appeared in the first model are 
employed in the second model. They include: whether the candidate is experi-
enced; whether the candidate is a Republican or not; the opposition candidate’s 
disbursements in thousands of dollars; whether the candidate is competing in a 
fragmented media market; and Democratic presidential vote share. I also include 
a dummy variable for open seat races.
Outside Spending and Candidate Competitiveness
Before the presentation of the results, a brief overview of the expenditure choices 
of the population of non-incumbent candidates competing in 2012 and 2014 
general elections provides helpful context for both the magnitude of the effects 
that are uncovered and the normative implications of the findings for House elec-
tions that are discussed in the conclusion. Most importantly, not all non-incum-
bent House campaigns choose to air television advertisements. While almost all 
open-seat candidates chose to air ads both before and after the 60-day reporting 
window in 2012 and 2014, only 13% of the challengers who went on to run in the 
general election aired television ads before the reporting window opened and 
only 27% of the challengers running in the general elections of 2012 and 2014 
chose to air television ads after the 60-day window opened. 501(c) organizations 
aired early television advertisements in 25% of House races that included a non-
incumbent candidate in 2012 and in 13% of House races matching that criteria 
in 2014. Similarly, super PACs aired television ads before the 60-day reporting 
window in 21% of House races in 2012 and in 11% of House races in 2014, which 
included a non-incumbent candidate. House races where the incumbent runs 
unopposed are not part of the sample employed in the models below. Thus, 
the impact of the uncovered effects is confined to a minority of House races. 
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However, in the discussion I will argue the impact is both politically significant 
and  normatively problematic.
The results of the logistic regression model can be found in Table 2. A glance 
at Table 2 reveals that the interaction term between early super PAC television 
advertising expenditures and campaign advertising expenditures is insignificant. 
In contrast, the interaction term between early 501(c) dark money organizations’ 
early television advertising expenditures and the campaign’s television advertis-
ing expenditures in the 60 days before the general election is significant and neg-
ative. Thus, early television advertising by 501(c) organizations undermines later 
spending on television advertising by the campaign. It is important to note that 
the dependent variable is measuring whether the campaign’s television adver-
tising expenditures shift competition in the challenger’s favor – while that shift 
might help the challenger win, it is not a guarantee that the challenger will win. 
This is a test to show the impact of campaign efforts to tip the balance of the race 
in favor of the challenger.
To provide a better sense of the effect size, Figure 1 displays the changes in 
the predicted probability of the race shifting in the challenger’s favor with sub-
sequent expenditures by both the campaign and 501(c) organizations on televi-
sion advertising. The x-axis represents the candidate’s ad spending in the 60-day 
Table 2: Likelihood of Competition Shifting in Challenger’s Favor.
Campaign Ad Spending In 60 Days Prior to General Election 0.003*** (0.001)
501(c) Ad Spending Prior to 60 Day Window 0.004*** (0.001)
Campaign Ad Spending X 501(c)Ad Spending −4.7e-06** (1.80e-06)
Super PAC Ad Spending Prior to 60 Day Window 0.003*** (0.001)
Campaign Ad Spending X Super PAC Ad Spending −2.39e-06 (1.59e-06)
Republican 1.124* (0.434)
Incumbent Disbursements 0.0001 (0.0001)
Quality Challenger 0.355 (0.418)
Fragmented Media Market 0.215 (0.424)
Campaign Ad Spending Prior to 60 Day Window −0.001 (0.002)






***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05. All monies in thousands of dollars. Year dummies not shown. 
Logistic regression utilized. Robust standard errors. Only incumbent-challenger races included 
in the sample.
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period of time leading up to Election Day after the reporting window opens. The 
slope of the line is the probability that the direction of competition in the race 
will shift in favor of the challenger – recall this measure of competitiveness is 
based upon the Rothenberg Political Report’s ratings of congressional races. The 
various lines indicate different representative values for 501(c) organizations’ 
early television advertising expenditures in the race prior to the 60-day reporting 
window opening.
What is immediately apparent in Figure 1 is that candidate campaigns must 
spend more than double the amount on television advertising than the 501(c) 
organization spends in order for the slope to remain positive and thus, for there to 
be predicted improvements in their campaign’s competitiveness. For example, if 
the 501(c) organization spends $300,000 on television advertising, and the cam-
paign spends at least $600,000 or more, the probability of shifting competition 
in the campaign’s favor remains positive with significant improvements in com-
petitiveness – as represented by the slope of the line increasing incrementally 
for every $100,000 the campaign spends on advertising (see Figure 1). However, 
as the 501(c) organization’s expenditures on television begin to approach the 
same amount spent by the campaign, the probability of shifting competition in 
favor of the campaign decreases. For instance, if the 501(c) organization spends 
$550,000 and the campaign spends $600,000, it is apparent that the slope of 
Figure 1: Interaction of Campaign and Outside Spending on Shift in Competition.
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the line begins to flatten out and thus, the improvements in competitiveness are 
much smaller with every additional $100,000 the campaign spends on television 
advertising (see Figure 1). These sums are large but 501(c) organizations spent 
$300,000 or more in 17 challenger-incumbent races in 2012 and 16 challenger-
incumbent races in 2014.
Additionally, there is a tipping point to the relationship between 501(c) 
organization’s expenditures and candidate campaign expenditures on television 
advertising. When a 501(c) organization spends $600,000 or more on television 
advertising early in the general election cycle, which they did in 3 challenger-
incumbent races in 2012 and 6 challenger-incumbent races in 2014, no matter 
how much the campaign spends on television advertising in the subsequent 
60 days there will either be almost no predicted improvements in competitiveness 
(i.e. the slope of the line flattens) or, with the highest 501(c) organization expen-
ditures, there will be a decrease in the probability that competition will shift in 
the challenger’s favor (i.e. the slope becomes negative). In effect, this means com-
petition will shift in favor of the incumbent candidate instead. For instance, at 
the maximum amount depicted of $1,300,000 spent by a 501(c) organization on 
a race, the probability of competition shifting in favor of the challenger is always 
decreasing no matter how much the candidate spends on television advertising 
– the slope of the line is negative (see Figure 1). In sum, early spending by 501(c) 
organizations on television advertising undermines the direct positive effect that 
the campaign’s expenditures on television advertising have on the challenger’s 
competitiveness.
When the analysis of the impact of early television expenditures by 501(c) 
dark money organizations is extended to the campaign’s total expenditures and 
not focused solely on the campaign’s television advertising expenditures, similar 
disruptive effects are uncovered (see Table 3). The dependent variable is com-
posed of the residuals from a regression of the candidate’s vote margin on the 
total expenditures made by the campaign – the tightness of the relationship is 
being tested to see if outside spending weakens it by increasing the residual vari-
ance. Early television expenditures by 501(c) dark money organizations increase 
the residuals by 0.024 for every thousand dollars spent by those groups on adver-
tisements airing in the district prior to the 60-day window before the general elec-
tion (see Table 3). In contrast, super PAC/PAC expenditures on early television 
advertisements register as insignificant suggesting they have no effect on the 
relationship between campaign spending and the candidate’s vote margin. The 
average amount spent on television ads by 501(c) dark money organizations at 
the district level was $37,446 in 2012 and $35,324 in 2014 – this includes 48 races 
in 2012 and 33 races in 2014 where the general election cycle average or higher 
was spent by 501(c) organizations.
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To better understand how changes in residual variance relate to campaign 
spending effectiveness, it useful to examine the predicted residual variance at 
different levels of 501(c) spending going from the minimum to the maximum 
and to calculate the percentage change in the variance. If a 501(c) organization 
spends only the average amount on early television advertising in the district – a 
sum ranging between $35,000–$37,000 depending upon the election year – the 
campaign’s expenditures will be 4 percent less effective than if the 501(c) organi-
zation had spent no money in the district on television advertising. In races 
where 501(c) organizations spends $300,000, the campaigns’ expenditures are 
predicted to be 33 percent less effective than if a 501(c) organization did not make 
any expenditures on early television ads in the district. In the handful of races 
in which 501(c) organizations spend even more, the decrease in the campaigns’ 
spending effectiveness can exceed 50 percent.
To put all of this in perspective, take Illinois’s 10th district in 2014 as an 
example. 501(c) organizations spent $239,400 on television advertisements 
early in the general election cycle in the district, leading to a predicted 5.7 point 
increase in the residuals, which constitutes almost a half of a standard deviation 
increase in the residuals. Another way of expressing this is that the effective-
ness of the campaign’s spending – in terms of improving its competitiveness 
in the race as measured by vote margin – decreased by 26 percent due to 501(c) 
organizations’ advertising early in the election cycle. Given that this was a close 
race, in which Bob Dold, Jr. ultimately received 51.3 percent of the vote and Brad 
 Schneider received 48.7 percent of the vote, it is easy to see how the impact of 
early advertising by 501(c) organizations could have been significant. In this 
Table 3: The Effect of Outside Television Expenditures in the Congressional District on 
Residuals of Vote Margin and Campaign Spending.
PAC/Super PACs’ Early Television Expenditures ($) 0.002 (0.004)
Dark Money Organizations’ Early Television Expenditures ($) 0.024*** (0.007)
Experienced Candidate 4.855*** (1.004)
Democratic Presidential Vote Share (%) −0.014 (0.042)
Republican 1.223 (1.251)
Opposition Candidate’s Disbursements ($) 0.002** (0.0005)
Open Seat 7.885*** (1.304)
Fragmented Media Market −0.762 (1.000)
Constant −25.86*** (2.071)
Number of Observations 741
R2 0.210
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; standard errors in parentheses; all monies in thousands of 
dollars; OLS regression. Year dummy variable not shown.
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instance, Dold’s campaign dramatically outspent early spending by 501(c) 
organizations later in the cycle, spending $640,950 on television ads and a total 
of $2,483,535 on all forms of advertising (calculated from the FECs operating 
expenditure files). Had Dold been a worse fundraiser the outcome could have 
been quite different.
The Varying Impact of Outside Spending
Although the results indicate only around 20–30 percent of House races – either 
open seat or challenger-incumbent races – are likely to be affected by the deci-
sion of 501(c) dark money organizations to air television advertisements early in 
the race, the fact that around 75 percent of races theoretically remain unaffected 
should not diminish the import of the findings. First, it is possible dark money 
organizations will gain more influence overtime as they find their niche in elec-
toral politics and thus, a larger number of House races could be affected by their 
expenditures in the future. Second, seat margins of party control in the House 
have wavered between 30 and 60 seats since the late 1990s making interference 
in a few races more consequential than in previous eras. Those are the practi-
cal implications of the findings but for studies of campaign finance the results 
provide several important insights that might guide subsequent studies of 501(c) 
organizations and super PACs spending in House races.
The results support the idea that super PACs and 501(c) organizations play 
different roles in House elections. Previous studies suggest super PACs in par-
ticular have engaged in “functionally coordinated” activities, such as mirror-
ing the advertisements candidate campaigns produce themselves (Farrar-Myers 
and Skinner 2012) and paralleling party activities in the race (Farrar-Myers and 
Skinner 2012; Herrnson 2012; Dwyre and Kolodny 2014; Dwyre and Braz 2015). A 
“functionally coordinated” alliance might be reasonably expected to boost the 
effectiveness of campaign spending because independent spending by super 
PACs could either “allow campaigns to concentrate their resources elsewhere” or 
help supplement targeted expenditures made by the campaign thereby amplify-
ing their effects (Christenson and Smidt 2014). While the results certainly do not 
rule out the possibility that alliances with super PACs and PACs could be helpful 
to House campaigns, there is not enough evidence to confirm such “function-
ally coordinated” spending is occurring – rather the evidence indicates these two 
types of outside spending have very different effects. Dark money was shown to 
be disruptive using two different models, whereas independent expenditures 
made by super PACs and independent spending PACs had insignificant effects 
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in both models suggesting super PACs’ early television advertising expenditures 
do not decrease the effectiveness of campaign expenditures. Further testing of 
other ways super PACs’ and PACs’ electoral expenditures might actually be bene-
ficial to non-incumbent campaigns are undoubtedly needed and are left to future 
research. Conversely, if 501(c) organizations intend to spend their money to assist 
non-incumbent candidates – something that the data cannot test directly in this 
study – the findings suggest to an extent their expenditures are having the oppo-
site of their intended effect.
Further, this study points to the importance of considering how campaign 
finance laws impact the strategic choices of these respective interest group 
organizations and the related impact of those choices on the tactical choices of 
congressional campaigns. Tax status requirements faced by 501(c) organizations 
incentivize them to maintain at least the appearance of not having electoral activ-
ities as their primary purpose. As a consequence, in House races, 501(c) organiza-
tions are more likely to air advertisements before the 60-day reporting window 
opens whereas super PACs/PACs, which do not share this constraint, concentrate 
most of their television advertising in the 60 days leading right up to Election Day 
(see Table 1). 501(c) organizations are also more likely to air ads that promote 
policies and are less likely to air ads that attack candidates than super PACs/PACs 
(see Table 1). In turn, the results indicate the choices that are made in response 
to legal constraints influence the utility of respective outside group advertising 
expenditures for non-incumbent campaigns.
For the 20–30 percent of House races that are impacted by 501(c) dark money 
organizations’ expenditures on early television advertisements, the repercussions 
are substantial. Challengers must be able to spend almost double the amount of 
funds on television advertising than the 501(c) dark money organizations spend 
in order to maintain marginal gains in their competitive position in the race. In 
races where 501(c) organizations commit the most resources, the results of the 
first model suggest increased fundraising may not be enough to offset the effects 
of 501(c) organizations’ early television advertising. The results of the second 
model suggest when 501(c) organizations choose to make expenditures to influ-
ence the race, the negative effects of their spending are not solely confined to 
expenditures on television advertisements. In fact, the effectiveness of the cam-
paigns’ total disbursements also diminishes. For every thousand dollars that the 
501(c) organization spends, the strength of the relationship between the cam-
paigns’ expenditures and the candidates’ vote margin declines as represented by 
an increase of 0.024 in the residual variance (see Table 3). For most races, where 
501(c) organizations spend roughly the average of $35,000–37,000, the cam-
paign’s expenditures will be marginally less effective in terms of improving the 
candidate’s vote margin. However, in the 17 challenger-incumbent races in 2012 
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and 16 challenger-incumbent races in 2014 where 501(c) organizations spent at 
least $300,000, campaign expenditures are predicted to be 33 percent less effec-
tive, and in the handful of those races in which 501(c) organizations spend even 
more than $300,000, the decrease in the campaigns’ spending effectiveness is 
predicted to exceed 50 percent.
Arguably these effects are uncovered because both the timing and content 
of the ads aired by 501(c) dark money organizations create challenges for non-
incumbent campaigns. Non-incumbent campaigns have difficulty gaining fund-
raising momentum, establishing a campaign organization (Biersack, Herrnson, 
and Wilcox 1993; Krasno, Green, and Cowden 1994; Herrnson 2012; Smidt and 
Christenson 2012), and gaining visibility (Jacobson and Carson 2016) early in the 
election cycle when all of these start-up costs are higher. Thus, the early timing 
of the bulk of 501(c) organizations advertisements occurs when the campaign 
is least equipped to respond with its own set of advertisements. Non-incum-
bent campaigns also have difficulty setting the issue agenda (Abbe et al. 2003; 
 Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin 2009, p. 344; Jacobson and Carson 2016). Early 
advertising by 501(c) organizations likely hinders efforts by the campaign to 
establish the policy agenda and control the message being delivered to voters 
(Devine 2017). Although the models do not explicitly test whether expenditures 
on policy advertisements are solely responsible for decreases in the effectiveness 
of the campaign’s expenditures, it is reasonable to assume the content of the ads 
also plays a role in the disruptive effects that are uncovered as policy ads make 
up a majority of the ads aired by 501(c) organizations early in the general elec-
tion cycle (see Table 1).
Higher costs and decreased spending effectiveness together mean that non-
incumbent campaigns have to make it into in a higher fundraising quintile in 
order to have the same impact when 501(c) dark money organizations are spend-
ing to influence the race. These findings raise questions about the fairness of 
electoral competition in an outside spending saturated environment and the 
ability of campaigns to control the content of their messages to voters and to 
ensure that the campaign’s messaging is actually reaching voters as the number 
of advertisements by all stakeholders in the election rises. While supporters 
of the Citizens United ruling would be quick to defend the freedom of expres-
sion rights of 501(c) dark money organizations, the results of this study suggest 
that their speech comes at a cost to candidates even if that is not the intended 
effect. Given the decrease in the campaigns’ spending power, the results indicate 
affected non-incumbent campaigns might be better off devoting more of their 
resources to voter mobilization, which has been shown to be effective (Green, 
McGrath and Aronow 2013; Enos and Fowler 2016), rather than sinking more 
money into television advertising. However, regardless of campaign’s strategic 
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adjustments, the results make it clear that when 501(c) dark money organiza-
tions target their district with early advertising, non-incumbents’ campaigns 
must work even harder to remain competitive.
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